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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A BEACON FOR REFORM OF INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Daniel Gervais*
I. Introduction
This Article attempts to resolve clashes between intellectual property 
and investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”). ISDS clauses contained in 
bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral trade and investment agreements give 
multinational investors (corporations) a right to sue a state in a binding 
proceeding before an independent arbitral tribunal.1 This jurisgenerative 
right to file a claim against a state in an international tribunal with 
mandatory jurisdiction is exceptional; it is generally reserved to other 
states.2 Only multinational corporations can use ISDS to file claims against 
states in which they invest, provided the state is party to a bilateral 
investment treaty (“BIT”) or a trade agreement containing an investment 
chapter (“International Investment Agreement” or “IIA”).3 The ISDS case 
filed by the global pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly against Canada based 
* Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law, Vanderbilt University Law School and 
Director of the Vanderbilt Intellectual Property Program. President, International Association 
for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (“ATRIP”). The 
Author thanks Dan Burk, Susy Frankel, Christophe Geiger, Molly Land, Tim Meyer, Svetlana 
Yakovleva and Peter Yu,  for their useful comments on the initial draft or for agreeing to 
discuss the ideas developed in this Article. The Author also wishes to thank the editorial team 
at the Journal for their excellent work on the manuscript. All errors and opinions expressed 
should be attributed to the Author and not to any other person or organization.
1. See Fact Sheet: Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-
dispute-settlement-isds (last visited Jul. 25, 2018) [hereinafter USTR Fact Sheet]. The main 
remedy available to investors is the payment of compensation, as investor-state dispute 
settlement (“ISDS”) tribunals cannot order a government to change a measure even if it found 
to have affected the rights of an investor. See id. The possibility of paying additional 
compensation in the future to the complainant (assuming the impact on the investment 
continues) or to other investors similarly affected, however, may lead a country to change the 
impugned measure. See Adam H. Bradlow, Human Rights Impact Litigation in ISDS: A 
Proposal for Enabling Private Parties to Bring Human Rights Claims Through Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 43 YALE J. INTL. L. 355, 388 (2018) (explaining how the 
threat of ISDS can be sued to change human rights norms).
2. See José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (2011).
3. See id. at 31; see also Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced 
Approach to Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 483, 489–90 (2001); 
David R. Sedlak, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the 
Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 147, 147–49 (2004). 
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on the invalidation by a Canadian court of two patents was the first direct 
major clash between IP and ISDS.4
The case added a layer to the already highly controversial nature of 
ISDS. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-winning economist and major critic of 
ISDS, noted in a letter to Congress that ISDS protected foreign property 
more than domestic property and that prior experience with ISDS suggested 
that ISDS locked in “regulatory boundaries, by subjecting any changes to 
laws or rules by Federal, state or local government to challenge by foreign 
investors.”5 Moreover, ISDS proceedings cost millions of dollars. In the 
Philip Morris case (discussed later), Uruguay might have had to settle had it 
not been for the reported financial support it received from Michael 
Bloomberg.6 Along similar lines, a group of more than 200 law professors 
asked that no trade deal containing ISDS provisions be signed by the United 
States, noting that ISDS gives foreign corporations the ability to bypass the 
“robust, nuanced, and democratically responsive” U.S. legal framework; 
circumvent local, state, or federal domestic administrative bodies and 
courts; and “re-litigate cases they have already lost in domestic courts.”7
This is no small issue: according to the United Nations, as of 2016, there are 
3,304 IIAs in existence around the world (2,946 BITs and 358 other treaties 
with investment provisions), and they cover almost all countries.8
The traditional justification for ISDS is that it provides a remedy for 
uncompensated or improperly compensated expropriations of private assets 
owned by, or for the unfair or inequitable treatment of, foreign investors.9 In 
recent years, however, ISDS has moved well past traditional, or direct, 
expropriation—that is, transfer of property rights to the state. Two core 
4. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, (March 16, 
2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=UNCT/14/2
[hereinafter The Canada Award].
5. Letter from Joseph E. Stiglitz to U.S. Cong. (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/265770405/Letter-to-Congress-Stiglitz-on-Trade-Deal.
6. See James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and 
Enforcement from the WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 427, 436 (2017) (noting “Uruguay would have had to settle the case with Philip Morris 
had billionaire philanthropist Michael Bloomberg not volunteered to fund the costs of ICSID 
litigation.”). The average cost, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), is $8 million but can reach $30 million. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn 
Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy 
Community, 19 (OECD, Working Papers on Int’l Inv. No. 2012/03), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en.
7. Laurence H. Tribe et al., 220+ Law and Economics Professors Urge Congress to 
Reject the TPP and Other Prospective Deals that Include Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS), PUB. CITIZEN (Sept. 7, 2016), www.citizen.org/documents/isds-law-economics-
professors-letter-Sept-2016.pdf.
8. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2016: 
Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2016, at 101 (June 22, 
2016) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report].
9. See USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
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norms of ISDS—indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment 
(“FET”)—have been pushed by investors in ISDS proceedings in new areas 
of law and policy. Investors routinely use claims of indirect expropriation to 
challenge regulatory measures that do not effectuate a direct expropriation 
but rather “effectively neutralize” the enjoyment of the property.10 Investors 
have also made abundant use of the FET standard, a most controversial 
issue in ISDS scholarship.11 In the context of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (the “NAFTA”), an interpretive note issued by the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission tried to stem this tide by stating that the 
FET standard does not require “treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by the customary international law minimum standard 
treatment of aliens.”12
Eli Lilly v. Canada is a case about two pharmaceutical patents that were 
invalidated by Canadian courts for lack of utility. The tribunal in this case
used both indirect expropriation and the FET standard.13 The case is a prime 
example of ISDS’s notable recent incursion in the field of intellectual 
property (“IP”), an incursion that is said to have caused a “regulatory 
chill”—namely, the risk that a regulatory change might trigger liability if it 
increases the costs or decreases the profits of a foreign investor, as the 
invalidation of a patent might by preventing capture of the patent rent.14 No 
10. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, ¶ 200 (Sept. 3, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 66 
(2006).
11. See GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
182–83 (2015).
12. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Note of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions (July 31, 2001), 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/commission/ch11understanding_e.asp; see also North 
American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 ILM 289 
(1993). On the FTC, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade 
Commission and the Rule of Law, in FIFTEEN YEARS OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 ARBITRATION
175 (Frédéric Bachand & Emmanuel Gaillard eds., 2011).
13. The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 181; see also Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 12,
at 181.
14. See Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, The Incredible Shrinking Victory: Eli Lilly 
v. Canada, Success, Judicial Reversal, and Continuing Threats from Pharmaceutical ISDS, 49 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 505 (2017) (“The risks of regulatory chill are of course exacerbated by 
general IP-maximalist pressures from the United States, the European Union, Japan, 
Switzerland, and other pro-pharma countries, and by extra-arbitral pressures relating to 
specific ISDS claims, such as those described previously concerning the Eli Lilly v. 
Canada arbitration.”); Plamen Dinev, Regulatory Chill and the TTIP: An Intellectual Property 
Perspective, 39 EUR. INT. PROP. REV. 344, 345 (2017) (noting that “[p]erhaps the most 
fiercely criticised aspect of the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP is the possibility of regulatory 
chill.”); Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM.
U. L. REV. 829, 859 (2017) (“Regulatory chill, while difficult to prove, is particularly 
problematic in the intellectual property field . . . .”). Patent rents are the difference between 
marginal costs and the sales price made possible by the patent right. Patent rents are typically 
used to cover new research and development, but in the case of pharmaceutical companies go 
mostly toward profits and advertising. Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: 
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industry is more dependent on patent protection than pharmaceuticals: 
products are enormously costly to develop and test, but once a new drug is 
on the market, it can be copied at a very low cost, meaning that the (usually 
only) way to recoup investments and turn a profit is the market exclusivity 
provided by a patent.15 Yet pharmaceuticals differ from other consumer-
oriented goods, in part because consumers often rely on doctors—who may 
be influenced by pharmaceutical marketing—and in part because the 
product is often paid for by public authorities. This causes a tension 
between a policy of fostering pharmaceutical innovation, on the one hand, 
and using the public purse responsibly, on the other.16 Baker and Geddes 
argue that, in this context, the enormous profits that patents can help 
generate “give perverse incentives to right-holders to advance spurious and 
marginal claims . . . The growing number of ISDS cases based on IP claims 
is troubling indeed, as is their in terrorem effect.”17
A second ISDS complaint, filed by Philip Morris against Uruguay 
under the Swiss-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”), directly 
challenged IP (trademark) measures taken by Uruguay. The complainant 
described these measures as indirect expropriation and a FET violation.18
Because tobacco control is seen by many as a crucial public health measure, 
the case was seen as a frontal challenge to Uruguay’s regulatory 
sovereignty.19
IP is a particularly interesting field of study in the ISDS context for at 
least three reasons. First, IP sits at the intersection of private property rights 
and public policy objectives of innovation and economic and human 
World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 
325 (2005).
15. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 88–89 (2008).
16. See Michelle C. Perez, Trading Goods for Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined by 
Investor State Dispute Mechanisms?, 49 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 132, 166 (2018) (“The 
general consensus was that not only was this a great victory for Uruguay and the concept of 
national sovereignty”); Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to 
Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 218–19 (2015). 
Canada has a publicly-funded healthcare system that covers most of the cost of many 
pharmaceutical products. See, e.g., Ontario Public Drug Program –Public Information, ONT.
MINISTRY HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/public/
programs/drugs/ (“[I]f you qualify, Ontario’s drug programs will pay most of the cost of some 
of your prescription drugs.”). 
17. Baker & Geddes, supra note 14, at 513.
18. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 193, 313 (July 8, 2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/
casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/10/7 [hereinafter The Uruguay Award].
19. See Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113
AM. J. INTL. L. 1, 15 (2019) (“The objection is that ISDS has tended to strike a balance 
weighted too heavily in favor of investor property, at the expense of host 
state regulatory autonomy. . . .”).
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development.20 This Article examines whether and how ISDS tribunals 
adjudicating claims by investors that their (private) IP rights were unduly 
affected by state action can and should reach beyond the text of the 
applicable IIA and into the public policy realm. Putting the spotlight on the 
ISDS/IP interface illuminates similar impacts of ISDS on the state’s ability 
to intervene in key policy areas.
Second, IP law by nature crosses lines that separate legal disciplines. In 
the field of ISDS, in which investors are pushing for protection of private 
rights, IP also reflects public policy choices, on the one hand, and now also 
human rights.21 In the context of both Eli Lilly v. Canada (concerning 
pharmaceutical patents) and Philip Morris v. Uruguay (concerning tobacco 
control), the right to health in particular comes to mind.22 The following 
Venn diagram shows that there will be cases in which all three domains (IP, 
human rights, and investor protection) intersect. The award in the Uruguay 
case discussed below provides a good example of a triple intersection.
20. See id. at 3. Domestically, public law is the law of relations between the state and
the citizen, which IP does to a point (as with applications to register rights or criminal 
enforcement of IP rights), and private law is the law of relations between citizens (such as 
property—of which IP has at least some of the contours—torts and contracts). See Hanoch 
Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1401–06 (2016) 
(discussing Nozick’s, Rawls’, Dworkin’s and Kant’s views on the public law/private law 
distinction). Public law reflects public policy choices, such as for the provision of public 
health services. The distinction is useful though it may not always be clear and coherent. See
id. at 1406–09.
21. Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. J. INT’L L.J.  1, 1 (2008) (“[H]uman rights law is 
intellectual property’s new frontier.”).
22. This article uses the term “human rights,” but the same reasoning could apply to 
internationally-recognized social rights. For a discussion of the overlaps and distinctions 
between the two notions, see Robert Wai, Countering, Branding, Dealing: Using Economic 
and Social Rights In and Around the International Trade Regime, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 35, 70–
71 (2003).
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Third, and finally, newer IIAs provide sector-specific public interest 
carve-outs that aim to put certain regulatory matters beyond the reach of 
ISDS tribunals. For example, recent IIAs signed by the European Union (the 
“EU”) exclude environmental protection measures from ISDS review.23
Then, as the Eli Lilly v. Canada case was proceeding, Canadian and EU 
negotiators made a last minute change to the text of the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (the “CETA”) by adding a declaration that 
effectively excludes most IP measures from the jurisdiction of ISDS 
tribunals.24 Such exclusions pose an interpretative challenge: should policy 
areas not so named a contrario remain subject to closer scrutiny (for 
23. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., arts. 22.1, 23.2, 
24.3, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA]; Free Trade Agreement Between 
the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, E.U.-Sing., art. 13.1(a), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961/ (not yet signed) (last updated Apr. 
18, 2018); Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Union and Its 
Member States, on the One Hand, and Central America on the Other arts. 286, ¶¶ 1–2, 287, 
June 29, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 346) 1; Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its 
Member States, of the One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, Colom.-E.U.-Peru, 
arts. 269, ¶ 3, 270, ¶ 2, June 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 354) 1; Free Trade Agreement Between 
the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the 
Other Part, E.U.-S. Kor., arts. 13.4, 13.5, Oct. 6, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 1. 
24. The tribunal in Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2) 
was constituted in April 2014. Case Details: Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case 
No. UNCT/14/2), INT’L CTR. FOR INV’R-STATE DISPUTES, WORLD BANK GRP., 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=UNCT/14/2 (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2019). The CETA declaration was agreed upon in August 2014. See Michael Geist,
Did Canada Cave on the Pharmaceutical Patent ISDS Issue in CETA?: Still No Text, But 
Official Comments Suggests It Did, MICHAEL GEIST (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2014/08/canada-cave-pharmaceutical-patent-isds-issue-ceta-still-
text-report-suggests/; Gus Van Harten, A Report On The Flawed Proposals For Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) In TTIP And CETA 7(Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 16, 2015).
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example, the vast majority of IIAs that, unlike CETA, do not carve out IP) 
and, if so, according to which test or standard?25
The topic is also timely. ISDS, which emerged in earnest in 1993 in the 
NAFTA, is also contained in the more recent Dominican Republic-Central 
America FTA (the “CAFTA-DR”).26 In fact, ISDS clauses now apply to 
almost all bilateral trade relations, though they are being negotiated as part 
of major trade deals where they may undergo significant changes.27 ISDS 
will likely form part of the possible new trade deal between the world’s two 
largest trading partners (the European Union and the United Sates), known 
as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (the “TTIP”)—should 
it come into being—as the United States insists on having the clause, and 
the EU’s current position in international trade talks is to reform, not 
exclude, ISDS.28 The EU has proposed creating a permanent ISDS court “in 
order to develop a coherent, unified and effective policy on investment 
dispute resolution.”29 The Transpacific Partnership (the “TPP”) Agreement 
also contains ISDS provisions, and such provisions are likely to be included 
25. See infra notes 144 and 183 and accompanying text.
26. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 
5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. The ISDS provisions are in
Chapter 10. See Vivian H.W. Wang, Investor Protection or Environmental Protection? 
“Green” Development Under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 260–61 (2007). 
27. Under the “new NAFTA,” the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), ISDS 
provisions were removed between Canada and the United States, though U.S. investors still 
have three years to use NAFTA’s ISDS system. See Jack Caporal & William Alan Reinsch, 
From NAFTA to USMCA: What’s New and What’s Next?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC INT’L STUD.
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/nafta-usmca-whats-new-and-whats-next.
28. ISDS has been one of the stumbling blocks in the more recent TTIP negotiations 
due to EU demands to improve the mechanism by creating a permanent investment court, an 
option discussed further in Part V, infra. See Luis Miguel Velarde Saffer & Amir Ardelan 
Farhadi, Lessons from the Deathbed of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Are Recent 
Critiques of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) System Warranted?, 11 DISP.
RESOL. INT’L 3, 5 (2017) (“Criticisms of the [ISDS] system are not new, and have been
stumbling blocks in the negotiation of other investment treaties, such as the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Nevertheless, the solution should not be to abandon 
the system, but rather to improve it. This has been the case in the context of the TTIP 
negotiations, where the European Commission proposed the creation of the so-called 
investment court to address, among others, concerns regarding arbitrators’ impartiality and the 
system’s transparency.”). Saffer and Farhadi discussion emphasizes the contrast between 
private rights in goods the use of which in almost all cases is decided by private actors, and 
goods in which public policy choices are embedded (often but not necessarily a public good). 
A number of IP rights have both aspects. The owner of a patent can decide how to exploit (or 
not) that patent. But the usage of patents related to materials significantly affected by public 
policy (pharmaceuticals, certain classes of weapons etc.) will be directly regulated or, as is the 
case with the patents and trademarks at play in the two cases discussed in the Article, will at 
least intersect with public policy concerns. See generally id.
29. Questionnaire on Options for a Multilateral Reform of Investment Dispute 
Resolution, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?
consul_id=233 (last updated Jan. 7, 2018). 
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in most future BITs.30 This Article suggests ways in which both future trade 
agreements and any permanent forum established to hear ISDS cases can 
better integrate vital public policy concerns by using intellectual property as 
a beacon for reform.
Against this backdrop of expansion and critiques of overreach, many 
countries are sticking with ISDS but simultaneously trying to reform it to 
limit its reach in policy areas where they wish to preserve regulatory 
autonomy.31 For example, India carved out an exception for intellectual 
property compulsory licensing in its most recent model BIT, precluding 
such disputes from ISDS.32 Stated differently, with over 3,000 IIAs in 
existence and more to follow, ISDS is here to stay, but a reform of its scope 
and mode of application is afoot.33
As more and more carve-out clauses emerge, what is the situation for 
IIAs that contain no such carve-outs? Can states avoid paying compensation 
ordered by an ISDS tribunal for public policy measures that affect private IP 
rights without such exclusions? As will be apparent from the Article’s 
accounts of two major recent ISDS cases, the respondent states justified in 
different ways the compatibility of the IIAs containing the applicable ISDS 
clauses (NAFTA and the Swiss-Uruguay BIT) with the IP measures
30. For information on the TPP, see Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP. (Oct. 4, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership; Trans 
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans 
Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) - Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam: Background and 
Negotiations, ORG. AM. STATES FOREIGN TRADE INFO. SYS., http://www.sice.oas.org/
TPD/TPP/TPP_e.ASP (last visited Jan. 7, 2018). For a discussion about the inclusion of ISDS 
provisions in BITs, see Nikesh Patel, Note, An Emerging Trend in International Trade: A 
Shift to Safeguard Against ISDS Abuses and Protect Host-State Sovereignty, 26 MINN. J.
INTL. L. 273 (2017) (reviewing bilateral and plurilateral agreements and model BITs 
containing ISDS provisions in several parts of the world, in both developing and merging 
economies). 
31. See Patel, supra note 30, at 302 (“As recent global trade policies and agreements 
suggest, changes to ISDS signal an emerging shift towards further safeguards against ISDS 
abuses and greater protections for host state sovereignty.”); Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, 
Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J.
INT’L L. 361, 408 (2018) (arguing that States need flexibility in their approach to ISDS and 
noting that “[c]ontexts differ across states, and choices should depend on those contexts.”).
32. See Sonia E. Rolland & David M. Trubek, Legal Innovation in Investment Law: 
Rhetoric and Practice in Emerging Countries, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 355, 397 (2017) (“Article 
2.4 [of the 2016 model BIT] carves out from the treaty local government measures, which is a 
vast exclusion for a federal state like India, any measure related to taxation and a number of 
other issues such as compulsory licenses of intellectual property rights . . . .”).
33. See Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, And Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-
State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410, 410 (2018) (“[M]any states view investor-state 
arbitration as akin to a horse that has bolted from the barn. Wishing to close the stable door, a 
wide range of states are considering the merits of various reform proposals.”).
Winter 2019] Investor State Disputes & IP 297
challenged by Eli Lilly and Philip Morris, respectively.34 Canada argued that 
the invalidation by a court of two pharmaceutical patents could not be 
reviewed in an ISDS proceeding and that such invalidation amounted 
neither to indirect exportation nor to unfair or inequitable treatment. 
Canada, in other words, played the game within strict ISDS boundaries.35
Uruguay took a different approach to defend itself against Philip Morris’ 
claim that its plain packaging legislation was expropriatory and constituted 
a violation of FET. Beyond traditional ISDS arguments, it invoked human 
rights to justify limits on the use of trademarks on cigarette packs.36
The Article proceeds as follows. First, it presents the Eli Lilly v. 
Canada dispute in Part II. The Article then turns to Philip Morris v. 
Uruguay in Part III. In Part IV, the Article compares and contrasts the two 
awards. Using lessons from this comparative analysis in Part V, the Article 
examines a number of existing and possible new doctrinal mechanisms that 
could be used to resolve IP/ISDS clashes and considers the role that human 
rights might play in this context.
II.  Eli Lilly v. Canada
A. Overview of the Dispute
Eli Lilly v. Canada drew considerable attention, both in Canada and 
around the world.37 This Part provides a brief overview of the case and 
considers the Tribunal’s findings that are most relevant to the IP/ISDS 
interface.38
Eli Lilly, the claimant, is a pharmaceutical company headquartered in 
the United States and distributing throughout the globe. The dispute 
stemmed from the invalidation of two patents on Lilly’s drugs Zyprexa and 
Strattera (atomoxetine and olanzapine, respectively) by Canadian courts for 
34. See NAFTA, supra note 12; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Switz.-Uru., art. 10, Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 389.
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-
State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines – Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2015); Sean Flynn, Section III: Issues 
Concerning Enforcement and Dispute Resolution, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 353 (2017); Gathii 
& Ho, supra note 6; Ho, supra note 16; Valentina S. Vadi, Towards A New Dialectics: 
Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health and Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 113 (2015).
38. For a comprehensive picture of the case, see case documents (including party 
briefs) available at Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2), 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/
pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?caseno=unct/14/2 (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
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failure to meet one of the core patentability criteria: utility.39 The case was 
heard at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the 
“ICSID”) in Washington, D.C.—a forum of choice for investor-state 
disputes—under the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (the “UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules.40
ICSID is known for the discreetness and effectiveness of its services.41
Under the UNCITRAL Rules, an ad hoc tribunal, usually composed of three 
experts, is established to hear each case.42 Although ICSID hearings 
typically are not public—and calls for more transparency have been made—
the “memorials” (briefs) filed by the parties and expert reports, as well as 
tribunal orders, are generally made available to the public on the ICSID 
website.43
Eli Lilly used the notion of indirect expropriation to challenge the 
judicial application of patent law to specific inventions. In a nutshell, Lilly 
argued that it “relied on Canada’s patent law when it sought patent 
protection for Zyprexa and Strattera and launched those drugs in Canada” 
and that the patents were issued “after a careful review by Canada’s patent 
examiners in light of Canada’s utility” doctrine.44 Because new 
interpretations by courts of patentability criteria normally apply to existing 
patents as well as future ones,45 any significant change tightening the 
interpretation of a patentability criterion could, in Lilly’s view, amount to 
expropriation of its intellectual property. This argument amounted to a 
challenge by a private, non-state actor to Canada’s sovereign ability to 
regulate and evolve its patent law through court interpretations. It is 
important to bear in mind in this context that patent invalidity is a common 
defense to a patent infringement lawsuit, and a significant number of patents 
39. Utility is one of the basic patentability criteria in US and Canadian patent law. The 
Canada Award, supra note 4, Claimant’s Memorial, ¶ 4 (Sept. 29, 2014). In countries other 
than the United States and Canada, a standard known as industrial applicability is an 
approximate equivalent of the utility criterion. See Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents art. 52, ¶ 1, Nov. 29, 2000, 2001 O.J. EUR. PAT. OFF. SPEC. ED. NO. 4, at 54, 77.
40. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1120 (parties may submit claims under ICSID 
Convention or UNCITRAL Arbitration rules).For the text of UNCITRAL, see U.N. Comm’n
on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Its Forty-Sixth Session, annexes I, II, U.N. Doc. A/69/17 (2014). 
For a discussion of how UNCITRAL has struggled to update its rules due to divergences of 
views among States, see Roberts, supra note 33.
41. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign 
Investment: The Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 97, 103 (1986). 
42. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, supra note 21, art. 7.
43. See J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State 
Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681, 
706 (2007).
44. The Canada Award, supra note 4, Claimant’s Memorial, ¶ 20. 
45. E.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (examining the validity of two software patents issued in 2001 and 2003 based on the 
new interpretation of patent eligibility in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014)).
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challenged in courts are invalidated in whole or in part when EU, Japanese,
and United States cases are aggregated.46
Eli Lilly also argued that the interpretation of patentability criteria by 
Canadian courts violated Canada’s obligations to afford “fair and equitable 
treatment” to Lilly’s investments under NAFTA.47 Specifically, Eli Lilly 
alleged that the court decisions violated: (i) protection against arbitrary 
treatment because Canada’s patent law is completely unpredictable and 
unreasonably difficult to satisfy; (ii) protection of legitimate, investment-
backed expectations; and (iii) protection against discriminatory treatment.48
B. The Award
The Tribunal released the Award in March 2017.49 Though the Tribunal 
rejected all of Eli Lilly’s substantive claims on the merits, the case remains 
relevant for IP policy in part because the Tribunal had no difficulty 
accepting that patents were protected investments as opposed to the 
research necessary to generate the invention protected by the patent, which 
may have been invested in another country.50 Stated differently, a protected 
investment can be limited, it seems, to prosecution of the patent application 
in a country where no research has taken place.51
The applicable rules of interpretation in this case included the text of 
the IIA at issue—NAFTA52—and “applicable rules of international law[,]” 
which NAFTA specifically mentions.53 According to the Award, those 
applicable rules are articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (the “VCLT”), as well as “other applicable rules of international 
law that may be relevant to the case before it.”54 This comes as no surprise; 
46. For 2015 data, see Douglas R. Nemec & Scott M. Flanz, After Period of High 
Invalidation Rates, New US Patent Challenge Procedures May Slow Down to Moderate Pace
(April 26, 2016), SKADDEN, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/04/after-
period-of-high-invalidation-rates-new-us-pat. In a 2015 case before the Supreme Court, the 
debate was whether the defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is a defense. The court found 
that it was not. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015).
47. The Canada Award, supra note 4, Claimant’s Memorial ¶ 18.
48. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
49. See The Canada Award, supra note 4. 
50. See id. ¶¶ 167, 469 (referring to the Zyprexa and Strattera Patents as “the 
investments at issue in this arbitration”) The TRIPS Agreement prohibits discrimination as to 
the place of invention. Cf. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
51. A second, separate investment might be the subsequent commercialization of the 
product protected by the patent.
52. The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 4
53. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 102, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
54. The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 106. See generally Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties art. 31 ¶ 3(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (requiring a treaty to be 
interpreted in light of the parties’ subsequent agreements) [hereinafter VCLT].
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it is generally well-accepted that the VCLT articles on treaty interpretation 
reflect customary international law.55 ISDS tribunals often apply them even 
where the applicable IIA is silent on applicable rules.56 Indeed, a detailed 
review of 229 ISDS awards revealed that 132—approximately sixty 
percent—of those cited the VCLT.57
On the merits, the tribunal concluded that only egregious errors by a 
domestic court could be subject to an ISDS claim absent a due process or 
equivalent procedural fault.58 “Egregiousness” is a known standard in 
determining the existence of a breach of customary international law.59 In 
adopting that standard, the Tribunal refused to categorically exclude review 
by ISDS tribunals of patent invalidations by domestic courts, but it set the 
bar for complainants very high, noting that this review could only happen 
“in very exceptional circumstances, in which there is clear evidence of 
egregious and shocking conduct.”60 The Tribunal accepted “the analysis and 
conclusions of the NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal in Glamis Gold v. 
United States on the content of the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment.”61 In Glamis Gold, the tribunal defined the standard 
as “an act that is sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of 
justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due 
process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall 
below accepted international standard.”62 Bad faith, though not a formal 
requirement, is often present in such cases, which adds a crucial dimension: 
it seems self-evident that neither Eli Lilly nor Phillip Morris could establish 
bad faith as the motivation for the measures they were attacking.63
55. See LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶ 99 (June 27); 
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 53, ¶ 48 (Nov. 12).
56. See, e.g., Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10, Decision on Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 56–57 (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C247/DC1030_En.pdf. 
57. TRINH HAI YEN, THE INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 38 (2014). 
58. See The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 224.
59. See, e.g., id.; Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 620, 627 (June 8, 
2009), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf; International Thunderbird 
Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States, Award, ¶ 194 (Jan. 26, 2006), 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_award.pdf.
60. See The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 224. The Tribunal also quotes from Glamis 
Gold, Ltd. v. United States that violating the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment requires “a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a 
complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons.” Id. ¶ 222
61. The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 222. 
62. Glamis Gold, ¶ 627; see also The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 224.
63. Glamis Gold, ¶ 22 (“[A]lthough bad faith may often be present in such a 
determination and its presence will certainly be determinative of a violation, a finding of bad 
faith is not a requirement for a breach . . . .”)
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Though courts are organs of the state, the Tribunal also agreed with 
Canada that ISDS tribunals are not courts of appeal for domestic courts.64
Thus, the Tribunal accepted Canada’s claim that its courts’ interpretation of 
patentability criteria effectuated a valid exercise of discretion in the 
application of public policy objectives. As the Tribunal explained, the 
appropriate test was the existence of a “rational connection” between the 
policy objective and the measure.65
The Award referenced several earlier arbitral awards to justify its 
conclusions, as could be expected since a broad quantitative survey of ISDS 
awards shows that ISDS tribunals “tend to follow an approach based in a 
common law, rather than a civil law, tradition when addressing interpretive 
issues.”66
Before turning to Philip Morris, it is important to note that neither 
human rights nor broader principles of international law beyond the ones 
sparingly used to interpret the treaty—such as the VCLT—played a 
significant role in the Award. This absence may be due to the fact that 
Canada did not invoke human rights or fundamental rights in its counter-
memorial, nor in its Rejoinder on the Merits.67 As we shall now see, matters 
took on a very different hue in the second case.
III.  Philip Morris v. Uruguay
A. Overview of the Dispute
Philip Morris v. Uruguay, also heard at ICSID, was based on a 1988 
Switzerland-Uruguay BIT.68 Philip Morris, the global company known 
mostly for its sale of tobacco products, and its local affiliate in Uruguay 
challenged two public health measures adopted by Uruguay to reduce 
smoking, especially among young smokers. The challenged measures 
included a “single presentation” requirement that prohibited different 
packaging or “variants” for cigarettes sold under a given brand.69 For 
64. The Canada Award, supra note 4, ¶ 221.
65. Id. ¶ 423. 
66. Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An Empirical 
Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 357 (2008). 
67. See The Canada Award, supra note 4, Counter –Memorial (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4131.pdf; The Canada 
Award, supra note 4, Rejoinder Memorial (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ITA%20LAW%207014.pdf.
68. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra note 
34.
69. The “Single Presentation Requirement was implemented through Ordinance 514 
dated 18 August 2008 (‘Ordinance 514’) of the Uruguayan Ministry of Public Health (the 
‘MPH’). Article 3 of Ordinance 514 requires each cigarette brand to have a “single 
presentation” and prohibits different packaging or ‘variants’ for cigarettes sold under a given 
brand.” The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶ 10.
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example, Philip Morris could no longer sell Marlboro Red, Marlboro Gold, 
Marlboro Blue, and Marlboro Green (Fresh Mint); it had to pick one and 
only one, and it picked Marlboro Red and its licensee in Uruguay ceased 
selling all other product variants.70 A second measure, known as the “80/80 
Regulation” imposed an increase in the size of prescribed health warnings 
on the front and back of the cigarette packages from 50% to 80%, leaving 
only 20% of the cigarette pack for trademarks, logos, and other 
information.71 Claimants argued that these measures impacted sales, 
affected their trademark value, and reduced the value of their investments in 
Uruguay, thus impairing the use and enjoyment of their investments.72 They 
also argued that the measures constituted a lack of FET, a denial of justice, 
and an indirect expropriation.73 Uruguay responded, inter alia, that it 
adopted the measures as a matter of public health (presented as a human 
right) and to implement the WHO (the “World Health Organization”) 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (the “FCTC”).74
B. The Award
A majority of the ISDS tribunal (2-1) agreed with Uruguay that the two 
challenged measures—though imperfect or even defective policy 
implementations when their outcomes are measured against their stated 
objective(s)—constituted a valid exercise of the country’s “police powers”
and “[a]s such” they could not constitute an expropriation.75
The Tribunal’s main finding in this respect was that the challenged 
measures were not “arbitrary and unnecessary” but rather were potentially 
effective means to protect public health.76 The measures were introduced as 
part of a larger scheme of tobacco control, and it was difficult to disentangle 
the exact impact of their different components. Overall, however, smoking 
70. Id.
71. Id. ¶ 11. 
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶¶ 10–12.
74. Id. ¶ 13; WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 
U.N.T.S. 166. See generally The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: An 
Overview, WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 1, 1 (Jan. 2005), 
http://www.who.int/fctc/about/WHO_FCTC_summary_January2015.pdf?ua=1.
75. The notion of police powers in international law “refers to the state’s right to 
promote a recognized ‘social purpose’ or the ‘general welfare’ by regulation.” The Uruguay 
Award, supra note 18, ¶¶ 305–07 (emphasis added). In the Award, Arbitrator Gary Born 
noted, in his separate opinion, that it was even “[m]indful of Uruguay’s extensive legislative 
authority and broad regulatory discretion, it [was] impossible to see how a hastily-adopted 
measure that is so ill-suited to its articulated purpose, and that treads so far onto protected 
rights and interests, can satisfy even the Tribunal’s stated standard.” Id. Annex B ¶¶ 176–77. 
See also Jon A. Stanley, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory Takings as 
Defined in International Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15
EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 349, 373 (2001).
76. The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶ 306.
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in Uruguay did decline, notably among young smokers, thus giving 
Uruguay the benefit of the doubt with respect to policy.77 The two-prong test 
applied by the Tribunal gave Uruguay generous regulatory leeway: the 
Tribunal considered the measure valid if (a) the objective was legitimate 
and (b) it was “capable of contributing to the achievement” of said policy 
objective.78 The Tribunal deemed public health a legitimate objective and 
the measures capable of contributing to this end. As in Eli Lilly v. Canada,
the Uruguay Award aimed to follow in the footsteps of previous ISDS 
awards.79
Human rights references appear twice in the Uruguay Award. First, 
European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”) jurisprudence is used both 
to reinforce the normative underpinning of the police powers doctrine and to 
extend its scope.80 The Award makes capacious use of the police powers 
doctrine, citing a number of previous ISDS awards—though not IP-
focused—in support of its use of ECtHR precedents.81 Among them was 
Tecmed Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States,
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Fauchald supra note 66, at 357.; and E. Gaillard, Use of
General Principles of International Law in International Long-term contracts, INTL BUS.
LAWYER, 217 (May 1999), (“[A]rbitral tribunals have a strong tendency to use precedents
established by arbitral awards rendered in similar circumstances.”) The Uruguay Award cited, 
inter alia, Methanex v. United States, a case in which the tribunal stated:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, 
inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and 
compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part 
IV ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf.
Another well-known ISDS case cited in the Award is Saluka v. Czech Republic, in which the 
tribunal had noted that it was well established in international law that “states are not liable to 
pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory 
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the 
general welfare.” Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 255–56 (Mar. 
17, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf.
80. See The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶ 295 (“[A] range of investment decisions 
have contributed to develop the scope, content and conditions of the State’s police powers 
doctrine, anchoring it in international law. According to a principle recognized by these 
decisions, whether a measure may be characterized as expropriatory depends on the nature 
and purpose of the State’s action. Some decisions have relied on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, based on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention.”)
Interestingly, the Award also notes, “Among international conventions to which Uruguay is a 
party is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, whose Article 1, 
Protocol 1, is another source of decisions regarding the police powers doctrine.” Id. at n.403. 
81. Id. at n.390.
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a case in which the arbitral tribunal examined “the actions of the State . . . to 
determine whether such measures are reasonable with respect to their 
goals.”82 The reference to the ECtHR decisions was not used to justify the 
application of a specific right in the ECHR but rather to assess the 
proportionality of the impugned measures and the state’s “margin of 
appreciation” in implementing a measure when faced with competing 
norms—intellectual property and investment protection on the one hand, 
and public health on the other.83 The second human rights reference in the 
Award appears in the description of the FCTC as guaranteeing “human 
rights to health.”84 Unfortunately, the Award does not discuss the basis for 
that finding nor its exact consequences.
It is worth noting that there was a significant divergence of views in the 
Uruguay Award between the majority opinion and arbitrator Gary Born’s 
partial dissent. Mr. Born took the view that there is no general principle of
proportionality in international treaty interpretation and that the terms of the 
BIT between Switzerland and Uruguay should govern.85 The dissent also 
discusses whether the “margin of appreciation” states a general principle of 
international law—and therefore is applicable to all IIAs—or whether it is 
instead regime-specific and thus must be found in the terms of the IIA at 
issue.86 The next Part turns to that exact question.
IV.  Comparative Analysis of the Awards
This Part compares the most directly relevant elements of the Canada 
and Uruguay Awards—namely, the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and the role of human rights. It then draws lessons on 
the standard of review that should apply in the ISDS context when a tribunal 
is called upon to review a regulatory measure or change in the law effected 
by legislation, regulation, or a court or administrative agency when such 
measure or change is presented under an indirect expropriation theory or a 
FET violation.
A. The Margin of Appreciation Issue
ISDS scholarship describes the state’s margin of appreciation in this 
context as granting states “some latitude to make initial determinations as to 
whether their actions” fall within the scope of measures not precluded by 
the IIA containing the ISDS clause, so that the function of the ISDS tribunal 
82. Tecmed Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3785/DC4872_En.pdf. 
83. The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, at n.404.
84. Id. ¶ 304. 
85. Id. Annex B ¶ 191 (Born, dissenting). 
86. See Alvarez, supra note 2, ¶¶ 138, 182–85. 
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is to determine “the permissible and legitimate boundaries of the margin of 
appreciation that arises from the terms of  the [IIA].”87 The Uruguay Award 
illustrates that, even in an ISDS proceeding, the notion can be defined more 
broadly as reflecting regulatory leeway in implementing any commitment in 
an international instrument.
The Uruguay Award uses ECtHR decisions revolving around a broad
margin of appreciation notion that applies to states party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) to implement their 
international law obligations.88 This notion of margin of appreciation is 
situated at the “core of the European human rights culture.”89 It is common 
to ECtHR jurisprudence and the EU legal order, though it is not always 
interpreted the same way in both.90 At the ECtHR, it “stands for the notion 
that the authorities of each party state to the [ECHR] ought to be allowed a 
certain measure of discretion in implementing the standards enshrined in the 
Convention.”91 By contrast, in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (the “CJEU”), it is used more or less interchangeably 
with the notion of margin (or scope) of discretion.92 A number of 
commentators note that it also fits squarely within the CJEU’s jurisprudence 
on proportionality.93
To make sense of what looks like a doctrinal salad bowl intermixing 
different tests, one can turn to scholarship on the notion of margin of 
appreciation, the relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU, and, more 
generally, the relationship between the ECtHR and international law.94
87. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 370 (2008).
88. The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, ¶¶ 531–32. Philip Morris’ denial of justice 
claim is discussed by and received some support from Gary Born, who filed a 
concurring/dissenting opinion. See id. Annex B ¶¶ 44–72. 
89. NINA-LOUISA AROLD LORENZ ET AL., THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE -
A PARADOX OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN EUROPE? 69 (2013). 
90. Id. at 69–70.
91. Id. at 73.
92. See id. at 90.
93. Id. at 91–92.
94. See, e.g., Christina Binder, The European Court of Human Rights and the Law of 
Treaties, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FRAGMENTATION OR UNITY? 41, 46, 56 (Christina Binder & Konrad Lachmayer eds., 2014) 
(discussing the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR”) limited reception of 
international law, including the VCLT); MAGDALENA FOROWICZ, THE RECEPTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 352 (2010) (“Although 
exclusively aimed at applying and enforcing the ECHR, the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg 
bodies has become porous to international sources and influences.”); HANNEKE CECIEL 
KATRIJN SENDEN, INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN A MULTILEVEL LEGAL 
SYSTEM : AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COURT OF 
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 141 (2011) (comparing the approach of both courts un 
cases involving human and fundamental rights and noting that “it would be difficult, it would 
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Although this Article obviously cannot and should not try to summarize this 
vast body of work, for our purposes, the narrower question we need to 
answer is whether the margin of appreciation doctrine as applied by the 
ECtHR and the related notion of proportionality are the optimal ways to 
judge a state’s leeway in assessing a national intellectual property regime’s 
compatibility with an IIA.95
The answer depends on three elements. First, there are several notable 
differences between ISDS and the ECHR. For example, the ECHR contains 
a reference to what is “necessary in a democratic society,” a phrase that is 
not common in IIAs.96 The term “democratic” arguably implies divergences 
in the polity of views of many matters and the ability to express those 
views, including on specific policy choices to implement treaty-based 
obligations and exact implementations of such choices.97 This, in turn, 
implies that states must have considerable leeway to implement obligations 
in a variety of ways.98 States with vastly different values and political 
systems enter into IIAs. To be clear, if states need policy leeway, it may not 
be for democratic reasons.
Second, a number of ISDS tribunals have tried to gauge the 
appropriateness or reasonableness of a measure, or the rational connection
between it and its stated objective. The margin of appreciation doctrine is 
not meant to perform this function. To the contrary, as Ronald Macdonald 
noted, the margin of appreciation approach may actually obscure the 
question of appropriateness.99
Third, the application of the margin of appreciation by the ECtHR “has 
become increasingly intertwined with the consideration of proportionality” 
in a way that makes the relationship between the two notions insufficiently 
clear.100 In this sense, as noted above, the ECtHR intermixes the test just as 
the CJEU tends to do.101 Proportionality at the ECtHR merely echoes the 
also be highly impractical and counterproductive if two different standards of fundamental 
rights protection were in force at the same time.”). See generally FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN 
THE EU: A MATTER FOR TWO COURTS (Sonia Morano-Foadi and Lucy Vickers eds., 2015).
95. See Helfer supra note 21, at 9–11. Of course, neither ISDS chapters in IIAs nor the 
ECHR are primarily intellectual property instruments, even though a number of ECtHR 
decisions have affected IP rights. See id. at 2.
96. European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
97. See DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 510–20 (3d ed. 2014).
98. See Ronald St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald ed., 1993). 
99. Id. at 124. 
100. William W. Burke-White & Andreas van Staden, Private Litigation in a Public 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 306–
07 (2010); see also Stephan W. Schill, General Principles of Law and International 
Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS 154 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds., 2012). 
101. See Helfer, supra note 21, at 10. 
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“fair balance” standard as required by article 1 of protocol 1 of the ECHR, 
which “provides governments considerable leeway to regulate private 
property in the public interest.”102 The article considers the two tests, 
therefore, as functionally similar as applied. The harder question is whether 
that test is useful in an ISDS context.
A state may justify a contested measure using a variety of tests. A 
negative test is probably the easiest: proving that a measure is not egregious 
is not hard, especially if the burden of proving egregiousness falls on the 
complainant.103 Then there are positive tests.
“Rational connection” is the lowest “positive” bar that a state must pass 
to justify a measure. Absent bad faith, very few measures would have no 
demonstrable rational connection with their underlying policy objective. 
The rational connection test is almost the reverse side of the egregiousness 
coin: if a measure has a rational connection to its stated objective, it is not 
egregious. The rational connection is not a complete bar, however.104
Indeed, this is a point of disagreement between the majority and the dissent 
in the Uruguay Award. Arbitrator Born did not argue that Uruguay adopted 
its tobacco control measures in bad faith but wrote that “the single 
presentation requirement does not bear even a minimal relationship to the 
legislative objective cited by Uruguay for the requirement” and that the 
measure was “arbitrary and irrational.”105
At a higher level, one would require evidence that a measure was 
effective in achieving its stated purpose.106 Under one approach—not 
102. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. For a discussion, see id.
103. See Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing and 
Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 355, 376 (2017) (“Arbitral 
tribunals rely on several factors in distinguishing legitimate regulation from regulatory 
expropriation. . . . Some tribunals have attempted to distinguish between the two types of 
regulation by looking at their goals, nature, and the manner in which they were applied. In 
doing so, they have relieved the state of the obligation to provide compensation where 
regulation had a legitimate public purpose and was applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.”)
For example, in Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award ¶ 132 (June 26, 2003), the panel noted that the 
complainant had to establish “[m]anifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading 
to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety.”
104. See, e.g., Belokon v. Kyrgyz Republic, Award, ¶¶ 231–34 (Oct. 24, 2014), 
https://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/3804 (finding that the administration of a bank 
during a period of violent regime had no rational connection with the state’s objectives); 
Charles H. Brower II, Politics, Reason, and the Trajectory of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 271, 298 n.117 (2017).
105. The Uruguay Award, supra note 18, Annex 2 ¶¶ 86, 88 (Born, dissenting).
106. Arguably the dissent in Phillip Morris v. Uruguay is situated somewhere between 
absence of a rational connection and lack of demonstrable effectiveness. See id. annex 2 ¶ 
119. (“[T]here were no documents or other materials accompanying any of the drafts of the 
proposed ordinances (in either 2008 or 2009) that explained the purpose or background of the 
single presentation requirement or how the requirement was contemplated to work in practice,
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applied in ISDS but common in international trade law—the state must 
prove that the measure was the least restrictive among available alternatives 
under the so-called “necessity tests.”107 The egregiousness standard adopted 
in the Canada Award may seem easier to apply than the broad but fuzzy 
police powers doctrine used in the Uruguay Award. Yet, in this Article’s 
view, they do not differ much in practice, for it is suggested that a measure 
would run afoul of the margin of appreciation in most cases if it was 
egregious, or worse, adopted in bad faith. Then, as already mentioned, 
egregiousness is arguably the flip side of rational connection, though its 
application might differ if burdens of proof are reversed.108
Naturally, a tribunal might be tempted to overlay its application of these 
tests with a normative pro-investor veneer given that a main object and 
purpose of ISDS instruments is to protect investors.109 The trade law 
standard from the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”). that requires a 
WTO member to show that it adopted the least trade-restrictive regulatory 
measure would transform ISDS radically and severely restrict regulatory 
leeway, but it is, as noted, not applied in ISDS.110 Put differently, though 
most ISDS tribunals will not second-guess the choice of policy objective of 
a respondent state, tribunals have two options: either limit themselves to 
gauging the appropriateness of the measure or insist on getting evidence 
from the respondent state that the measure was the least investment-
restrictive measure. The choice between those two options can lead to vastly 
different outcomes. Applying the margin of appreciation/proportionality 
doctrine or its doctrinal cousin—the egregiousness test—limits a tribunal’s 
nor that addressed any empirical evidence that would bear upon the requirement’s goals or 
efficacy.”)
107. Various variants (and thus exact levels) of this test exist. See WTO Secretariat, 
“Necessity Tests” in the WTO, WTO doc. S/WPDR/W/27 (Dec. 2, 2003).
108. The burden of proving a violation under the egregiousness standard would seem to 
fall naturally on the complainant. The rational connection test could be used either as an 
integral part of the complainant’s case, in which case that party would bear the burden of 
proving an absence of rational connection (something similar to the approach chosen by the 
WTO Panel in Australia Plain Packaging—Panel Report, Australia—Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications And Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
Applicable To Tobacco Products And Packaging, ¶¶ 7.2418–7.2420, WTO Docs. 
WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R (adopted June 28, 2018) 
[hereinafter WTO Plain Packaging Report]), or as a defense resting on the respondent’s
shoulders. 
109. The VCLT, supra note 54, provides the rules of treaty interpretation used by ISDS 
tribunals. Article 31(1) of the VCLT states that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.”) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Busta v. Czech 
Republic, Case No. V 2015/014, Final Award, ¶ 115 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber Com. 
Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8558.pdf,
(“The object and purpose of the BIT is the “promotion and protection of investments”). 
110. In an ISDS context, this might be called the least investor-impacting measure. See
Peter Van den Bossche, Looking for Proportionality in WTO Law, 35 LEGAL ISSUES ECON.
INTEGRATION 283, 288 (2008). 
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ability to restrict states to the least investment-impacting measure and is 
likely to provide more regulatory autonomy.
Perhaps because of this, a number of ICSID tribunals have chosen to 
follow the ECtHR’s path, at least formally. Those awards then tend to 
mention “proportionality” explicitly, as in Total v. Argentina, a case in 
which the tribunal stated that the “reasonableness of the normative changes 
challenged and their appropriateness in light of a criterion of proportionality 
also have to be taken into account.”111 There, the tribunal used 
proportionality to balance “the investor’s interest in regulatory stability and 
the host State’s interest in adaptation of the regularity framework . . . .”112
How does margin of appreciation or proportionality apply in the context 
of intellectual property and its link with policy targets such as public health, 
access to health innovations, and innovation policy? Choosing to follow the 
ECtHR’s approach affords considerable leeway to a state’s regulatory 
interventions. All arbitrators in the Uruguay Award recognized the 
importance of the public health objective that supported the restriction of 
Philip Morris’s use of its trademarks, though one arbitrator dissented on the 
appropriateness analysis and the very role of the tribunal in assessing it.113
This demonstrates that the ISDS/IP interface is quite unlikely to clash on the 
purpose of an IP measure (e.g., innovation or public health). The dispute is 
much more likely to center on how appropriate the measure is when viewed 
from an investment protection perspective. Hence, imperfect as it may be, 
applying the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation standard—and the related 
notion of proportionality to which it is increasingly assimilated—to answer 
this question leads to more favorable outcomes for respondent states than 
the application of the stricter standard of whether the challenged measure is 
the least investor-impacting.
The fact that the reasoning used by the ECtHR in assessing 
proportionality has been called upon in a number of ISDS awards to cross 
legal systems from human rights to international investment law shows the 
range of available standards that an ISDS tribunal might apply when 
reviewing state actions, “particularly[] the application of defenses . . . that 
raise quasi-constitutional issues.”114 That being said, some, but far from all, 
ISDS tribunals have agreed to cross the definitional waters that separate the 
ECHR and IIAs. In von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, for example, the tribunal 
stated:
[D]ue caution should be exercised in importing concepts from other 
legal regimes (in this case European human rights law) without a 
111. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on 
Liability, ¶ 134 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf.
112. Schill, supra note 98, at 156.
113. See supra notes 75 and 88.
114. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 100, at 302. 
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solid basis for doing so. Balancing competing (and non-absolute) 
human rights and the need to grant States a margin of appreciation 
when making those balancing decisions is well established in 
human rights law, but the Tribunal is not aware that the concept has 
found much support in international investment law.115
Still, the increasingly frequent use of ECtHR cases in ISDS awards might 
make it jurisprudence constante, which would be a significant development 
given the common law approach used by most ISDS tribunals.116 Part V 
explains how this can be accomplished in structured fashion.
B. A Role for Human Rights in ISDS Disputes Involving IP
As noted in the previous Part, unlike the Canada Award, the Uruguay 
Award expressly mentions human rights, specifically the right to health as 
enshrined in the FCTC. This was not a surprise, as references to human 
rights are common in ISDS awards.117 However, a survey of ISDS awards 
showed that “references to European human rights law are, in fact, as likely 
to come from investor claimants as respondent states. They are, in short, as 
likely to be used as a sword in favor of investor rights than as a shield to 
defend against them.”118 Indeed, “the ECHR and international investment 
regimes share at least two common general substantive goals: to protect 
access to justice and to protect some forms of property.”119
To take a regional example, the right to the protection of property is 
also one of the fundamental rights protected by the EU Charter, as is the 
freedom to conduct business.120 Some ISDS awards used those rights to 
adopt a narrow approach to other fundamental rights arguments. For 
example, an ISDS award noted that the term “basic rights” in an IIA should 
be interpreted to refer to “basic property rights,” not the broader legal and 
115. von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, ¶¶ 465–66
(July 28, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7095_0.pdf.
116. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 
108 (Sept. 5, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf.
On the common law approach, see Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, supra note 34. Jurisprudence constante may be defined as “a body of case law 
that meets a sufficient threshold of uniformity and consistency[. It] is, at a maximum, 
persuasive, but with ‘considerable authoritative force.’” Paul Cho, What if the International 
Criminal Court Could Prosecute President al-Assad for the Chemical Weapon Attacks in 
Ghouta?, 49 ST. MARY’S L.J. 165, 189 (2017).
117. See José E. Alvarez, The Use (and Misuse) of European Fundamental Rights Law 
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 519, 524 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2017).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 525.
120. Id. Examples of ISDS awards where the “fundamental right of property” in the 
ECHR was mentioned include Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, 
Decision on Liability, ¶ 129 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf.
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political rights that one might expect to be referenced by the term under the 
ECHR or other human rights instruments.121 This is not always the case, 
however. What can be described as broader human rights—in this context, 
rights beyond private property protection—played a role in a number of 
other ISDS awards. In Tulip Real Estate and Development v. Republic of 
Turkey, for example, the tribunal referenced, first, article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT and noted in this context that the VCLT’s reference to “relevant rules 
of international law” covered all sources of international law, including 
human rights law.122 It then concluded that “[p]rovisions in human rights 
instruments dealing with the right to a fair trial” were relevant to the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention and that using them did not add 
obligations extraneous to the ICSID Convention.123
The door is thus open to both parties to ISDS disputes to bring human 
rights arguments, whether for the investor to support the “property” 
component of intellectual property or for the state to justify measures to 
limit the scope of an intellectual property right. No explicit rule prevents an 
ISDS tribunal from considering such arguments, including as a way to 
“balance” outcomes.124 Let us now see what can be done to push the 
argument one or more steps further.
C. Lessons Drawn from Comparing the Awards
The Canada and Uruguay cases have both been described as efforts by 
multinational investors to limit the state’s ability to regulate its intellectual 
property regime by threatening to impose financial “penalties” for making 
decisions unfavorable to the complainants.125 The two cases were ultimately 
decided on very different bases. In Eli Lilly v. Canada, the right of domestic 
courts to make and change IP law was affirmed by the tribunal but 
121. Al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶ 521 (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf.
122. Tulip Real Estate & Dev. Neth. B.V. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/28, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 87 (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw7037.pdf.
123. Id. ¶ 92.
124. The desire of a number of arbitration tribunals to achieve balance in their decisions 
has been studied by a number of scholars. Puig and Strezhnev have identified frequent 
attempts to take account of the parties’ unequal access to legal resources, for example. See, 
e.g., Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, The David Effect and ISDS, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 731, 
733 (2017) (“[E]ven in the absence of formal guidance, investment arbitrators pay attention to 
the capabilities and potential resource constraints of the parties and behave in a way that is 
consistent with a preference for rectifying inequalities in litigation resources.”).
125. Cf. Vadi, supra note 37, at 186 (describing a trend of investors using international 
arbitration to challenge state regulatory regimes); Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property 
“Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the International Intellectual Property System, 35 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1123–24 (2014) (arguing that, if Eli Lilly succeeds in requiring Canada 
to change its utility standard, the implications could be “stunning” for intellectual property 
policy “in all countries”).
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considered reviewable—subject in an ISDS context to an egregiousness 
standard—absent a failure of due process.126 As a standard to measure 
domestic judicial decisions, egregiousness leaves scant room for human 
rights to enter the debate; it is not easy to see how a human or fundamental 
rights argument would make an otherwise egregious court decision 
acceptable. In contrast, the Uruguay Award expressly used the ECtHR’s 
margin of appreciation notion to recognize the state’s police powers to 
regulate health, a key public policy area.127 It also referred to the right to 
health enshrined in the WHO’s FCTC. Hence, though both the Canada and 
Uruguay ISDS awards give a good measure of deference to public policy 
measures, they do so on very different grounds.128
The police powers doctrine used in the Uruguay Award undoubtedly 
provides states with a fair degree of flexibility for acts by all branches of 
government.129 Put differently, the Award anchors in both the ECtHR’s 
margin of appreciation doctrine and the FCTC’s guarantee of the right to 
health, thus giving Uruguay almost invincible regulatory autonomy.130 The 
Tribunal’s normative triangle—with public policy goals in one corner, the 
possible influence of human rights in another, and the impact on the 
investor in a third corner—mirrors the Venn diagram in the introduction.131
It effectuates a “balancing” that offers significant analytical latitude to 
future ISDS tribunals willing to follow in those footsteps. By the same 
token, however, because the Tribunal’s framework widens the analytical 
spotlight, it may also give claimants more weapons, as the frequent use of 
fundamental rights to property by investors demonstrates.
In contrast, the tribunal in Eli Lilly v. Canada required a more focused 
discussion of the egregiousness of a measure—in this case, a court 
decision—which limited the scope of the analytical exercise. Though the 
egregiousness standard may not be crystalline, it provides a high bar for 
claimants and thus a good degree of predictability for the future—recalling 
that, beyond the substantive elements of the standard, the evidentiary burden 
rests with the claimant. For most states, the Canada Award provides a broad 
shield against ISDS challenges to judicial acts.
Based on this analysis of the tools available to ISDS tribunals, the 
Article now turns to a discussion of whether the doctrinal bridges built in 
these two IP-focused awards are sufficiently robust, especially in an EU 
context in which the need to comply with fundamental EU Charter rights 
might be invoked.132
126. Common law courts do make and change the law; they do not merely interpret it. 
See supra Part II.A.
127. See supra Part III.A.
128. See supra Parts II and III.
129. See supra note 80. 
130. See supra Part IV.A.
131. See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying illustration.
132. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/391.
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V. A Path Toward Inclusive ISDS
The prominent cases at the IP/ISDS interface, Philip Morris v. Uruguay
and Eli Lilly v. Canada, reveal different paths that ISDS tribunals can 
follow in factoring in public interest considerations. Philip Morris keeps 
public interest at bay by imposing the egregiousness test, a very difficult test 
for investors to meet, while Eli Lilly expressly balances investor protection 
against the public interest reflected in human rights.133 These different 
outcomes may be due in part to IP’s peculiar nature. IP stands, both 
normatively and doctrinally, with a foot in both private and public law.134 It 
thus differs from the more traditional property, or private law, interests that 
ISDS aims to protect. IP incorporates public policy objectives such as 
innovation, access to information, and public health, which are reflected in 
the mix of rights, limitations and exceptions to the IP rights of authors and 
inventors.135 As a relatively new phenomenon in the ISDS field (few ISDS 
tribunals have heard IP-related cases), Eli Lilly v. Canada and Philip Morris 
v. Uruguay serve as exemplars to probe how ISDS tribunals can deal with 
investment protection while factoring in broader public interest issues. The 
stark divergence of approach by the two tribunals illuminates the difficulty 
faced by ISDS tribunals in this context. Outcomes are difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict.
In this Part, the Article suggests a structured approach to build a robust 
interface between ISDS and IP against the backdrop of lessons learned from 
Eli Lilly and Philip Morris. Then, we answer the question of whether IP can 
serve, as the title of the Article suggests, as a beacon in other areas of law 
where public policy impacts the use of private property rights. The proposed 
approach could thus serve as a model doctrinal path for ISDS tribunals that 
wish to factor the public interest into their deliberations. The Article 
suggests that ISDS interpretive approaches that take account of the public 
interest can be termed inclusive ISDS, as opposed to ISDS focusing strictly 
on investor protection, which can be termed exclusive ISDS.
A. Applicable Parameters
International law does not recognize a supremacy or hierarchy of 
human or fundamental rights over trade and investment rules—at least not 
beyond jus cogens.136 As the International Law Commission noted, there is 
133. See supra Part IV.C.
134. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
135. See Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How 
Ethics Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop. &
Competition Law, Research Paper No. 13-06, 2013).
136. Jus cogens, or “compelling law,” refers to a body of “norms of general international 
law from which no derogation is possible.” Valentina Vadi, Jus Cogens in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 357, 357 (2015). Jus cogens can and 
has been applied by ISDS tribunals. See id. at 382 (“[J]us cogens . . . can play a legitimising 
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thus a possibility of “fragmentation” in this context.137 Therefore, building 
an interface between IP and ISDS or a triangular one between IP, ISDS, and 
human rights requires the application of norms from each sector 
“horizontally” to another area. As the previous Part demonstrated, beyond 
the text of IIAs, several key principles of international law permeate ISDS 
awards in a way that allows norms to cross legal disciplinary borders, 
particularly (a) the fundamental or human right to property and human 
rights invoked by respondent states to justify measures designed to 
implement such rights; (b) the notion of a state’s margin of appreciation 
“borrowed” from ECtHR jurisprudence; and (c) other basic principles such 
as the right to a fair trial.
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, also regularly invoked by ISDS 
tribunals, provide useful interpretive pathways for the texts of IIAs that may 
supplement or replace the use of the ECtHR jurisprudence and the notions 
of margin of appreciation and proportionality.138 VCLT “general balancing 
principles (such as transparency, non-discrimination, necessity, and 
proportionality) [are] used in deciding on whether national restrictions of 
freedom of trade are necessary for the protection of public interests.”139 Not 
unlike a number of ISDS cases discussed above, WTO dispute settlement 
reports often limit the scope of their review of WTO Members’ regulatory 
autonomy on the basis of general balancing principles, not ECtHR 
decisions. Moreover, such reports arguably have tended to apply a greater 
degree of deference when the policy area is of great importance, such as 
public health.140
One could end the analysis here and suggest that ISDS tribunals already 
have at their disposal a sufficient doctrinal toolbox composed of (a) the 
margin of appreciation and proportionality doctrines, which they can anchor 
in ECtHR jurisprudence, (b) the related police powers doctrine, and (c) the 
VCLT, which can support balancing efforts based on those doctrines. Is 
there another, possibly better option?
B. Express Interfaces
Including express interfaces in the text of IIAs is a common practice in 
trade law but thus far has not been used much in investment law. This 
role in investor-state arbitration, making sure that the most fundamental values of the 
international community are not violated by either foreign investors or host states . . . .”).
137. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
2006). 
138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
139. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining 
and Connecting the Two Fields, in Human Rights And International Trade (Th. Cottier, J. 
Pauwelyn, and E. Bürgi, eds) 29, 34 (2005).
140. See id. and the discussion on TRIPS and public health mentioned supra note 50.
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Section thus considers how such interfaces function in trade law to
determine whether there are obstacles to their use in the ISDS context.
Express interfaces can be seen as filters that limit claims that can pass 
through the jurisdictional sieve.141 The necessity test is an example of a 
filter: the tribunal can review a measure and must decide whether it passes 
the test.142 An exclusion, in contrast, means that, if the measure is found to 
be covered by the text of the exclusion clause, the tribunal must decline to 
review its adequacy.143
1. Express Interfaces in Trade Law
IIAs often contain express interfaces between trade law and 
fundamental rights that can take the form of either specific or general
exceptions.
Specific exceptions are those linked to the exercise by the state of a 
specific policy objective. Such interfaces provide leeway for identified 
regulatory measures to be taken without a violation of the state’s 
commitments and other trade obligations. Specific interfaces thus usually 
apply to named policy areas such as labor, environment, and sustainable 
development. Exceptions of this type are contained, for example, in the 
majority of post-WTO (1995) trade agreements negotiated by the EU.144
They often take the form of a list of international conventions setting out 
applicable standards that a member state (or the EU itself) has the right to 
implement.145 Another option is to provide safeguards for labor, 
environment, and sustainable development that put these interests expressly 
above that of trade liberalization. For example, under article 23.2 of the 
CETA, the parties “seek to ensure those laws and policies provide for and 
encourage high levels of labour protection and shall strive to continue to 
141. See Lise Johnson et al., International Investments Agreements, 2014: A Review of 
Trends and New Approaches, 2016 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 15, 47.
142. See id. (“Filter mechanisms limit the issues that tribunals may review, at least in the 
first instance; however, if the designated body or committee is unable to resolve the issue, it 
often reverts back to the tribunal for determination.”).
143. See id. (Exclusions go “a step further by excluding certain types of measures from 
review by arbitral tribunals altogether. These ISDS exclusions differ from filter mechanisms 
in that they preclude certain types of measures or actions from ever being reviewed by the 
tribunal.”).
144. CETA, supra note 23; Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the 
Republic of Singapore, supra note 23; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the 
European Union and Its Member States, on the One Hand, and Central America on the Other, 
supra note 23; Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the 
One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, supra note 23; Free Trade Agreement 
Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of 
Korea, of the Other Part, supra note 23.
145. See, e.g., Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of 
the One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, supra note 23.
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improve such laws and policies with the goal of providing high levels of 
labour protection.”146
General exceptions, in contrast, aim to preserve a state’s “right to 
regulate.”147 This “right to regulate” permits a departure from specific 
investment commitments assumed by a state. In a functioning democracy, it 
could also be defined as “an affirmation of states’ authority to act as 
sovereigns on behalf of the will of the people.”148 Whichever definition is 
accepted, one can legitimately posit that the right to regulate cannot be 
merely “what’s left” after a chunk of sovereignty is given up by a state in an 
IIA, as this would place trade liberalization commitments above other 
international legal obligations. Hence, the right to regulate is best seen as a 
principle ensuring that restrictions on state sovereignty are not interpreted as 
interfering with key areas of public policy.149
The most important general exceptions are those contained in article 
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”) and 
article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the “GATS”). 
The latter targets, inter alia, measures “necessary to protect public morals 
or to maintain public order” and “necessary to protect human . . . life or 
health.”150 They are thus subject to what is usually referred to as a necessity 
test.151 This test posits that trade liberalization commitments should trump 
other policy areas but for a demonstrable necessity (however that term is 
then defined in context) to adopt certain regulatory measures.152
There are in fact several versions of this necessity test in WTO 
Agreements.153 A classic exposition of one of the principal necessity tests is 
146. CETA, supra note 23, art. 23.2; see also Free Trade Agreement Between the 
European Union and the Republic of Singapore, supra note 23, art. 13.2, ¶ 2; Trade 
Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and 
Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part, supra note 23, art. 268.
147. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
52 (2014) (summarizing the “right to regulate”); id. at 169 (“Another way of incorporating an 
express right to regulate in an IIA is to draft a general regulatory clause applicable to the 
entire treaty.”). 
148. LONE WANDHAL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT 
TO REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 8 (2016). 
149. See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and 
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 
58–79 (2008) (comparing deference in trade and investment law toward the right to regulate). 
150. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 
(emphasis added).
151. See “Necessity Tests” in the WTO, supra note 111.
152. See Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149, 1206–07 (2013).
153. See Working Party on Domestic Regulation, supra note 111, ¶ 4 (referring to 
necessity tests (plural) and noting that “in spite of similarities between the wording of 
necessity tests in different WTO provisions, an interpretation developed in the context of one 
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contained in a report by the WTO Appellate Body, which explains that the 
following factors are relevant to test: (i) the degree of contribution made by 
the measure to the legitimate objective at issue; (ii) the trade-restrictiveness 
of the measure; and (iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of 
consequences that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective.154 It 
adds, “[i]n most cases, a comparison of the challenged measure and possible 
alternative measures should be undertaken.”155 This can be a very heavy 
burden to bear for a state to justify a measure, depending on (a) which party 
has the burden of proving the degree of contribution and trade-
restrictiveness of the impugned measure and the existence of alternative 
measures and (b) how “necessary” the measure is, as WTO cases reveal 
falling within broad range, the bookends of which are indispensability 
and just making a contribution respectively.156
Similar general exceptions are found in a number of IIAs.157 General 
interfaces do not prescribe the type of measure that can be taken by the 
state, but they do provide a standard against which they can be measured.158
A normative view of the right to regulate could be used to support the 
argument that the more a measure targets an area of significant public 
interest (such as implementing human rights obligations), the easier it 
becomes to justify its necessity before a trade dispute settlement tribunal.
Actual recourse to either specific or general interfaces not specific to IP 
to justify a prima facie violation of an IP-related commitment contained in a 
trade agreement is infrequent  for two interrelated reasons. First, there is a 
self-evident reason why specific interfaces not specific to IP are not used in 
IP-related cases. There are specific ones that would usually be applied first 
as the more targeted lex specialis.159 Second, lex specialis also explains why 
general exceptions are not typically invoked in trade disputes concerning IP.
case cannot be automatically transposable to other provisions. Each provision would have to 
be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement of which it is part.”)
154. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 322, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R 
(adopted May 16, 2012).
155. Id.
156. See Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 39 
AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 416 (2013); Eric M. Solovy & Pavan S. Krishnamurthy, TRIPS 
Agreement Flexibilities and Their Limitations: A Response to the UN Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel Report on Access to Medicines, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 69, 109 
(2017) (“Article 27.2 [of the TRIPS Agreement] contains a necessity test, which creates a 
significant burden on the Member taking advantage of this exception.”).
157. See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and 
Domestic Health Protections—Is A General Exceptions Clause A Forced Perspective?, 39 
AM. J.L. & MED. 332, 336–41 (2013).
158. See id. at 333. 
159. Lex specialis is a principle of legal text interpretation according to which a law 
governing a specific subject matter overrides a law that only governs general matters (or lex 
generalis). The Article discusses the interfaces specific to IP below. See infra Part V.B. See
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The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the 
“TRIPS”) itself contains two interfaces with fundamental rights. First, 
TRIPS provides its own “general” exception: “Members may . . . adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement.”160 Second, TRIPS contains a specific 
exception allowing WTO Members to exclude from patentability “the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.”161 That second interface is also found in 
NAFTA.162 Both TRIPS exceptions use the term “necessary,” a version of 
the above-mentioned necessity test.163
There are alternatives to the necessity test(s). Recall, first, that trade law 
includes a range of definitions of necessity that varies from being 
indispensable to simple evidence that a measure is “making a contribution” 
to the policy objective pursued by the authority that adopted the measure.164
Tribunals can even go below this range. Arguably, the lowest possible 
standard is that of rational connection: that is, merely proving that the 
measure is rationally connected to its stated objective would be sufficient to 
excuse a violation (or a trade obligation or, in the case of an ISDS 
proceeding, an expropriation or FET violation).165 The test was used in a 
negative context by the WTO Appellate Body to explain that a measure that 
bears “no rational connection to the objective” would be arbitrary and 
unjustifiable under GATT article XX, which governs general exceptions.166
At that point, any measure short of an arbitrary one passes the test.
We see something like this highly flexible approach in the 2018 panel 
report on the WTO dispute between Australia, on the one hand, and Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Indonesia, on the other hand. This 
dispute addressed whether Australia’s ban on figurative trademarks and 
also GRAEME DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS:
THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 186 (2012).
160. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 8.1. This text was not applicable in the 
Canada dispute because it is not contained in NAFTA, the IP chapter of which otherwise 
mirrors TRIPS to a large extent. See Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in International 
Copyright, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 374 (1998) (“The NAFTA intellectual 
property provisions were negotiated based on an early draft of the TRIPS Agreement, so the 
two agreements bear a striking resemblance to each other.”)
161. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art 27.2.
162. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1709, ¶ 2.
163. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 152, at 1205. 
164. See Stumberg supra note 156 at 408–9.
165. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres, ¶ 227, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007). The Appellate Body did 
not say, however, that this was the only test to determine compatibility with Art. XX. 
166. Id.
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severe restrictions on the use of word marks on cigarette packs—known as 
“plain packaging” measures—violated article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement 
prohibition on imposing “special requirements” that “encumber the use” of 
marks.167 The Australian measure plainly did. In that case, the panel refused 
to exclude the possibility that a rational connection might be ample reason 
to justify the prohibited encumbrance.168 As noted above, applying a rational 
connection test is probably the most generous way to provide regulatory 
flexibility, one which parallels in a positive way the negative test of 
egregiousness used in the Canada Award.169 A state authority can, in almost 
every case, demonstrate a rational connection between a measure and its 
underlying objective and, hence, any measure short of a purely arbitrary one 
would pass the test.170
Consider, in addition, then, that in Australia – Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications And Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable To Tobacco Products And Packaging,
the panel imposed on the complainants the burden of proving the absence of 
justification.171 This means that the case was, for all practical purposes, 
unwinnable. By imposing a burden on complainants to prove an absence of 
rational connection—despite acknowledging that the challenged measures 
were a priori prohibited by article 20 but for the justification test—the panel 
made it all but certain that Australia would win no matter what the evidence 
showed. The Australia panel report may be overturned or its application and 
practical import otherwise highly limited on appeal.172
2. Application to ISDS
Can language used to formulate exceptions to trade rules, whether IP-
specific or not, be used to craft an ISDS/IP interface? Several IIAs already 
contain sector-specific exclusions, some of which apply to both trade and 
investment using the same language. For example, the FTA between the EU 
and Singapore states that “it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic 
labour and environment laws.”173 The Association Agreement between the 
167. See generally WTO Plain Packaging Report, supra note 108.
168. See id. at 729.
169. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
170. See Stumberg, supra note 156.
171. See WTO Plain Packaging Report, supra note 108, ¶ 7.2169–7.2171, 7.2331. 
(establishing, at 729, that “unjustifiable discrimination” consists of the absence of 
justification, and holding at 679–80, that the complainant bears the “initial burden of proof”
for establishing “unjustifiable discrimination”).
172. See Notification of an Appeal by Honduras, Australia—Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/23 (July 25, 2018).
173. See also Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of 
Singapore, supra note 23, art. 12.1, ¶ 3; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the 
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EU and Central America goes a step further in its article 291(2), which 
requires parties “not to waive or derogate from, or offer to waive or 
derogate from, its labour or environmental legislation in a manner affecting 
trade or as an encouragement for the establishment.”174 In addition, 
paragraph 3 demands that parties “shall not fail to effectively enforce its 
labour and environmental legislation in a manner affecting trade or 
investment between the Parties.”175
To port this type of exclusion to the ISDS/IP context, one must start 
from the premise that, because the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals is tied to 
the text of the IIA, language matters enormously.176 Hence, a provision 
recognizing a state’s “right to regulate” its IP policy, for example, would be 
significantly constrained by attaching a necessity test or language that 
allows state regulation, “provided it is consistent with other provisions of 
this agreement,” such as that found in TRIPS article 8.1.177 Second, a “right 
to regulate” IP taking the form of a general “public interest” clause would 
facially offer broad flexibility, but it could be counterproductive if limited to 
specific public interest sectors, such as public health.178 Recall the question 
posed in the introduction: if a state were to add a sector-specific “right to
regulate” clause (say, for environmental protection or public health) to an 
IIA, would this not prompt an investor to argue both that earlier IIAs 
without this clause do not, a contrario, provide the necessary regulatory 
flexibility and that new IIAs do not provide such flexibility in other, 
unnamed sectors?179 This concern is real: intellectual property—and the 
human rights that support some claims to protect or limit IP—is typically 
not named in express interfaces in the IP chapters of recent EU IIAs. A 
limited right to regulate specific to other sectors, such as the protection of 
the environment, might thus deepen the legal morass for IP because IP sits 
outside those IIAs’ sector-specific “right to regulate” clauses.
There is, as mentioned above, at least one ISDS/IP specific interface: 
the one contained in the CETA.180 It is best seen as an exclusion rather than 
as a filter in that it is meant to exclude an evaluation by an ISDS tribunal of 
substantive intellectual property rules.181 Both the substance and the timing 
of the exclusion—occurring after the finalization of the main CETA text but 
European Union and Its Member States, on the One Hand, and Central America on the Other, 
supra note 23, art. 291, ¶ 1.
174. Agreement Establishing an Association Between Central America, on the One 
Hand, and the European Union and Its Member States, of the Other, art 291(2), June 29, 2012, 
O.J.L. 346 15.12.2012.
175. Id. Art. 291(3). ¶ 1
176. See TITI, supra note 147, at 111–15.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 99–103.
179. See id. at 294–95.
180. CETA, supra note 23.
181. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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as Eli Lilly v. Canada was proceeding—suggest that it was informed by the 
filing of the case against Canada by Eli Lilly.182 The CETA negotiators 
added to this declaration that investor state dispute settlement tribunals “are 
not an appeal mechanism for the decisions of domestic courts” and that “the 
domestic courts of each Party are responsible for the determination of the 
existence and validity of intellectual property rights.”183 CETA also reasserts 
that “each Party shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement regarding intellectual 
property within their own legal system and practice.”184 This exclusionary 
clause was described as the beginning of a new trend in international 
investment law.185 Indeed, the exclusion is mirrored in a more recent text, 
and an important one: the EU draft of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (the “TTIP”).186
The CETA precedent suggests that express exclusions of a range of IP-
related regulatory measures in future IIAs are both possible and desirable. 
Indeed, CETA could serve as a model due to its exclusion of judicial or 
other measures concerning the “existence and validity of intellectual 
property rights.”187 This Article supports this type of exclusion even though, 
as noted above, they must be crafted carefully to avoid a contrario
inclusions of certain measures in the scope of ISDS review, whether in IP or 
other regulatory areas.188
182. See supra note 24.
183. CETA, supra note 23, annex 8-D. This CETA exclusion may never enter into force 
for two reasons. First, in October 2016, after opposition from, inter alia, Wallonia (the 
French-speaking part of Belgium), it was reportedly agreed that the ISDS provisions of CETA 
would be submitted to the ECJ to determine their compatibility with EU law, in particular the 
ability of EU member states to implement and enforce public policy and fundamental rights. 
See Glyn Moody, EU-Canada Trade Deal Dodges Belgian Veto for Now, but Faces Multiple 
Legal Challenges, TECHDIRT (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20161027/
09490835898/eu-canada-trade-deal-dodges-belgian-veto-now-faces-multiple-legal-
challenges.shtml. Second, unanimous support from all 28 EU member states is required to 
ratify CETA, and in June 2018, Italy said it would oppose the agreement. See Francesca 
Landini, Italy Won’t Ratify EU Free-Trade Deal with Canada: Farm Minister, REUTERS 
(June 24, 2018 8:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-minister-canada-
trade/italy-wont-ratify-eu-free-trade-deal-with-canada-farm-minister-idUSKBN1JA0TR.
184. CETA, supra note 23, annex 8-D; see also Vadi, supra note 37, at 191.
185. See Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare? Intellectual Property Rights, 
Health, and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment Agreements, 6 J
INT’L DIS. SETL’T 252, 260-1 (2015).).
186. Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes, Eur. 
Union (Nov. 12, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/Nov./tradoc_153955.pdf
(“For greater certainty, the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights to 
the extent that these measures are consistent with TRIPS and Chapter X (Intellectual Property) 
of this Agreement, do not constitute expropriation. Moreover, a determination that these 
actions are inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement or Chapter X (Intellectual Property) of this 
Agreement does not establish that there has been an expropriation.”).
187. CETA, supra note 23, annex 8-D.
188. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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What if a state wished to go further and design a broader exclusion? 
Human rights arguments could play a role in that they constitute a good 
example of a key public policy area in which a state may be expected to act. 
As noted above, nothing prohibits ISDS tribunals from considering 
fundamental or human rights norms by the text of IIAs.189 This lack of 
prohibition, however, is unlikely to be good enough in this context. How 
can one ensure that these norms are fully considered in interpreting the 
scope and depth of the regulatory leeway used by the state? One way to 
make a human rights argument effective would be to require that
interpretation of the IIAs should not contravene an applicable human rights 
obligation.190 Interpreting the text of a measure challenged by an investor—
whether as indirect expropriation or a FET violation—can be directly linked 
to the state’s implementation of its human rights obligations or even of a 
key public policy objective. An interpretive rule to that effect could be 
added to IIAs in addition to specific exclusions.
Following this suggestion would mean that when a measure challenged
under the notions of indirect expropriation or FET can be directly 
reconciled with a state’s regulatory autonomy in an area of vital 
socioeconomic importance and/or a state’s implementation of its human 
rights obligations, then that measure should be presumed to be valid unless 
it can be shown that it was adopted to circumvent the underlying 
obligation.191 The proposed approach of applying the anti-circumvention test 
(well-known in trade law) changes the respondent state’s burden to rely on 
general notions such as the police powers doctrine, on which there is no 
consensus among ISDS tribunals.  It also offers a clearer analytical  path, 
namely asking, once it has been determined that the policy is in an area of 
vital socioeconomic importance, whether it was meant to circumvent 
investment protection obligations.192 This would have a potent effect that is 
“normatively stabilizing at a time when there are few agreed answers about 
189. See supra Part IV.B.
190. This is in line with Professor Wai’s suggestion that “an investment panel should not 
demand unduly high standards of compensation for regulatory or other legal reform directed 
towards the achievement of international human rights.” Wai, supra note 22, at 71.
191. The phrase “area of vital socio-economic importance” is taken from the TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 50, art. 8.1.
192. On the application of the anti-circumvention test in trade law, see Diane A. 
Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations 
and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INTL. L. 51, 118 (2014):
WTO law purposely delineates between a State’s justifiable exercise of regulatory 
freedom, from protectionist measures designed to circumvent commitments under 
the WTO Agreements. These trade agreements purposely accept that a margin of 
domestic regulatory freedom must continue to be maintained both as a matter of 
economic efficiency [. . .] as well as to build in a “safety-valve” precaution against 
unforeseeable contingencies that could disrupt the anticipated or forecasted terms 
of trade.
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the costs and benefits of globalization or the ideal shape of global economic 
governance in relationship to differing domestic policy paths.”193
The suggested approach is not the same as the application of the 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation doctrine. It may be supported as an 
offshoot of the doctrine in that it situates a state’s implementation of its IP 
policy within a “margin of appreciation” if it passes the above-mentioned 
contravention test. The approach also does not resemble current trade law, 
either in the form of the necessity test or the justification test.194 Rather, it is 
an explicit presumption of validity in case a measure can be directly 
reconciled with a state’s regulatory autonomy in an area of vital 
socioeconomic importance and/or a state’s implementation of its human 
rights obligations. The mobilizing principle, the Article suggests, should not 
be one of unimpeded and unaccountable state autonomy. A balance must be 
found between regulatory autonomy and protection of foreign investors 
against regulatory measures amounting to an expropriation. The proposed 
approach would both simplify and make more predictable the outcome of 
cases such as the two awards reviewed in this Article. It offers tribunals a 
clearer analytical path that does not rely on fuzzy norms such as 
egregiousness (which, in any event, is mostly limited to court decisions) or 
the police powers doctrine. ISDS clauses have legitimate purposes, among 
them strengthening the rule of law and deterring foreign governments from 
imposing discriminatory or abusive requirements.195 The suggested 
approach, therefore, is not to eliminate ISDS entirely but rather to apply the 
proper test when ISDS is used to challenge regulatory measures and to carve 
out policy areas in which ISDS should simply not venture. These carve-outs 
are required in areas where public interest considerations are likely to 
outweigh investment or property protection, bearing in mind that, in most 
cases, the investor still has access to domestic courts.
Such a debate could be had in the context of the preparatory work for 
the Multilateral Investment Court (the “MIC”) proposed by the EU, as the 
creation of a new forum provides a significant opportunity to ameliorate the 
current system.196 The EU’s commitment to the establishment of this court 
193. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years on: Global Governance by 
Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 76 (2016).
194. On the necessity test, see Solovy & Krishnamurthy,supra note 153. On the 
justification test, see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
195. See Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson, Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: Using Investor-State Dispute Settlement to Strengthen Environmental Law, 7 
SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 76, 90 (2017) (describing the purpose of ISDS in the TPP).
196. See Questionnaire on Options for a Multilateral Reform of Investment Dispute 
Resolution, EUR. COMM’N: CONSULTATIONS, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/
index.cfm?consul_id=233 (last updated Nov. 17, 2018); see also Ben Stanford et al., TTIP 
Negotiations in the Shadow of Human Rights and Democratic Values, 27 INT’L COMPANY &
COM. L. REV. 316, 319 (2016) (“In November 2015, following an extremely critical public 
consultation into the ISDS model which is commonly used in similar but smaller-scale trade 
agreements, the Commission revealed that it would instead pursue proposals for an investment 
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was reaffirmed in its Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan.197 If one 
agrees that the new court’s credibility depends at least in part on whether its 
mandate is based on appropriate interpretive principles, then a principle 
such as the one mentioned in the previous paragraphs could be included in 
the new court’s statute. This is compatible with the EU legal order in which 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights stands above trade and investment treaty 
rules.198 Including the principle in the new court’s statute would mean that 
states that agree to its jurisdiction would agree to be bound by it, as they 
agree to be bound by UNCITRAL or ICSID rules.199
The EU is uniquely situated to effectuate reforms of ISDS: it is a major 
player; it wants to keep ISDS, but it has seen a number of recent cases 
where the “ability of the [EU member] States to regulate in the public 
interest” was jeopardized, including a case about Germany’s decision to 
phase out nuclear power.200 The EU can count on other states, both 
developed (for example, Canada) and emerging (for example, India), to 
move this debate forward.201
Naturally, while the proposed MIC offers an institutional approach to 
reform ISDS, it is but one of the ways forward. Any ISDS tribunal could 
adopt the approach suggested in this Article, if it found it useful in its 
deliberations.
court to be included in the TTIP.”) (notes omitted). Notably, observers have criticized the
proposal for the high administrative costs it would entail. See Jonathan Klett, National Interest 
vs. Foreign Investment-Protecting Parties Through ISDS, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 213, 
236 (2016). It is unclear whether the high costs of proceedings, as things stand now, would in 
fact be a major obstacle.
197. See The EU-Japan Agreement Explained, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement/agreement-explained/ (last 
updated Feb. 06, 2018) (“The EU is committed to integrating its new approach to investment 
protection and dispute resolution – an investment court system – in all its new trade 
agreements. . . . [I]ncluding an investment court system in its trade agreements will help the 
EU build support for a public, international investment court with: highly qualified judges 
[and] transparent working methods[.] An international investment court would replace the 
current panoply of private arbitration arrangements contained in thousands of bilateral trade 
deals around the world.”) (emphasis in original).
198. See Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free Trade in 
Services and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection, 2 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 
191, 200–01 (2016) (“In the hierarchy of EU law, [trade agreements are] situated in between 
EU primary law, such as the Charter and the founding Treaties, and EU secondary law, such 
as EU regulations, directives and decisions. This approach is based on the principle of the 
autonomy of the EU legal order vis-a vis international law, which should respect the 
constitutional values . . . .”).
199. See UNCITRAL, supra note 40, at art. 1.3(a) (stating that the arbitral rules of 
UNCITRAL are binding upon the parties unless otherwise stated by the treaty).
200. Clémentine Baldon & Adèle Azzi, The New Investment Protection Policy of the EU 
in the Free-Trade Treaties (CETA, TTIP. . .): New Risks for the EU?, 2018 INT’L BUS. L.J. 3, 
5.
201. See Roberts, supra note 33, at 4, 6.
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VI.  Conclusion
Eli Lilly lost the gamble it played when filing its C$500 million 
investor-state dispute against Canada.202 Philip Morris similarly played and 
lost against the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. Yet, the cases reviewed and 
compared in this Article sounded alarm bells among intellectual property 
scholars. This Article briefly reviewed both cases to explain why IP scholars 
were taken aback. The Article then reviewed the mechanisms used in the 
two awards to bridge normative and doctrinal gaps between intellectual 
property and investment. IP stands at the confluence of public and private 
law streams. Finding a better way for ISDS tribunals to factor in the broader 
public interest reflected in IP legislation and jurisprudence is a challenge. 
The Article, after a review of proposed models to bridge such gap in trade 
law, general public law, and private law, provides guidance to ISDS 
tribunals in suggesting new possible approaches and a concrete interpretive 
principle to minimize conflicts between IP, the broader public interest, and 
ISDS.
202. Or did it? Eli Lilly undeniably lost the ISDS case, see The Canada Award, supra 
note 4, ¶¶ 469–71, but then in a strange twist, the Supreme Court of Canada, having read the 
Eli Lilly v. Canada ISDS award, threw the promise doctrine out of Canadian patent law in 
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2017 SCC 36, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943 (Can.). The Eli 
Lilly v. Canada ISDS case is acknowledged in the Canadian Supreme Court opinion’s first 
footnote.
